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Spy the little Spies 
Security and Privacy issues of Smart GPS trackers 
 
Abstract-Tracking expensive goods and/or targeted individuals with high-tech devices has been of high 
interest for the last 30 years. More recently, other use cases such as parents tracking their children have become 
popular. One primary functionality of these devices has been the collection of GPS coordinates of the location of 
the trackers, and to send these to remote servers through a cellular modem and a SIM card. Reviewing existing 
devices, it has been observed that beyond simple GPS trackers many devices intend to enclose additional features 
such as microphones, cameras, or Wi-Fi interfaces enabling advanced spying activities. In this study, we propose 
to describe the methodology applied to evaluate the security level of GPS trackers with different capabilities. 
Several security flaws have been discovered during our security assessment highlighting the need of a proper 
hardening of these devices when used in critical environments. 
Disclaimer-The opinions and results presented in this article are the sole responsibility of the authors. 
 
I. Introduction 
Sometimes close to illegal activities in certain countries, the deployment of GPS trackers 
to follow individuals and expensive commercial goods has regained interest in recent years. 
With the main purpose of sending GPS coordinates of the location of tracked devices or 
individuals, the GPS trackers are automatically and periodically collecting data and sending 
these to remote servers through cellular networks by using data connection or text messages.  
While reviewing multiple tracker solutions, it has been observed that the manufacturers 
of these devices have added smart features making these devices more than simple GPS tags, 
but fully operational spying devices with movement/noise detectors, microphones, cameras 
and additional wireless interfaces. 
The configuration of such devices is implemented through proprietary protocols over text 
messages. Before deploying such devices, users will have to configure a set of parameters such 
as the remote server IP address and the identification and authentication credentials, in order 
to, for examples, uploading the collected data to the cloud infrastructures. 
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From a security/privacy perspective it is obvious that an attacker who is able to get access 
to the phone numbers of the SIM cards provisioned in these trackers may endanger the 
covertness of operations or/and the expensive goods location use this information to mount 
targeted attacks.  
Only a few studies have been released covering the entire attack surface exposed by these 
devices. For instance, the valuable Trackmagedon [1] study highlights the security flaws 
existing in multiple cloud management system where the collected data originates from GPS 
trackers. Nevertheless, when looking at the architecture and protocols of such devices when 
deployed on the field, it can be imagined that an attacker would not only be interested in the 
cloud management infrastructures, but also targeting the GPS tracking devices through the 
mobile network (e.g. SMS configuration interface) to get access to the advanced features like 
the microphone or the stop engine (feature found in some GPS trackers to provide remote 
access to the car engine) feature. In this study, we propose to analyze the possible attack 
scenarios and attack vectors exposed by GPS trackers available on the market. From zero to 
full take-over of the infrastructure, a detailed security assessment is proposed, highlighting 
security critical vulnerabilities that are putting the users of such solutions at risk. 
The study is composed as follows: in Section II, we propose a review of the attack surface 
and potential attack vectors exposed by GPS trackers. Then, in Section III, a security 
assessment regarding the described attack vectors is summarized. Finally, conclusions are 
drawn highlighting the criticality of identified vulnerabilities and their potential impact on 
targeted people and exposed goods in terms of security and privacy. Moreover, the collection 
of data by these devices is discussed from a national security perspective. 
 
II. Attack Vectors 
A diagram representing the general architecture and points of interaction is proposed in 
Figure 1. As it can be observed, the attack surface is fairly large considering the amount of 
possible radio interfaces (GPS, mobile networks), the remote servers and running web 
applications, the smartphone applications and the configuration management protocols. 
Moreover, updating mechanisms (if they exist) are also interesting attack vectors to exploit. 
However, the set of tested devices in this study did not implement remote update mechanisms.  
In this section, we describe possible entry points for an attacker according to his 
objective. Note that some of these attacks may be illegal in certain countries. It is further worth 
to mention that all techniques and tools used in this study are known and available online either 
open source or as free versions of the software. 
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Figure 1: Architecture of the infrastructure related to GPS trackers with cellular modem 
 
II.A. Jamming and Spoofing attacks against the GPS signal 
An attacker whose goals are to either report wrong GPS coordinates or to block the 
transmission to remote servers can use low-cost GPS jammers or GPS spoofing tools. Low-
cost GPS jammers [2] can be found online in different formats. These attacks have already 
been detected across the world as reported in “140,000 unique electronic signatures for GPS 
jammers in Europe” [3] in 2017, highlighting the need of proper hardening mechanism for GPS 
trackers. 
 
  
 
Figure 2: Spoofing attack performed against UAVs, Smartphone and GPS trackers 
 
Advanced GPS attacks, namely GPS Spoofing, have been publicly described [4] and open 
source tools have been released online. Thus, using a software defined radio and the 
gps_sdr_sim software [5], an attacker is able to emulate a specific GPS satellite constellation 
in the vicinity of the targeted devices. The tools have been used for different sets of targets as 
depicted Figure 2 such as smartphones and drones. Note that an easy countermeasure would 
be to check third party information such as Cell_IDs to cross-validate the location of a specific 
tracker.  
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II.B Attacks against the management protocols 
With the goal of reconfiguring trackers to get access to the GPS coordinates in real-time, 
an attacker can try to change the IP addresses of the management servers and force trackers to 
transmit GPS coordinates to its own infrastructure. In order to avoid being detected, he can 
then transmit the data after modifying them on the fly towards the legitimate infrastructure. 
This attack obviously requires knowing the management protocol and the phone number of the 
SIM cards provisioned in trackers to exploit potential vulnerabilities in the management 
protocol. The complexity of this attack is directly related to the level of security of the 
management protocol and its implementation. Interestingly, plenty of GPS trackers user 
manuals are available online as for example on the FCC website [6]. 
 
II.C. Attacks against the cloud management, web application and smartphone 
applications 
An attacker may target the infrastructure to compromise the entire dataset of GPS trackers 
for a given manufacturer as demonstrated to other type of IoTs such as IP cameras [7]. The 
objective would be to directly attack the remote management infrastructure and the web/mobile 
applications available. By obtaining a set of trackers, the attacker will be able to reverse 
engineer protocols, the firmware, and the hardware parts. Then, an analysis of the mechanisms 
of authentication, identification, and available APIs will be leveraged to find security flaws 
leading to a point of entry. The level of accessible information makes this attack scenario the 
most effective since it potentially allows attacking a large number of trackers simultaneously. 
 
In what follows, we propose to go through different experimental set-ups and to 
summarize a set of security flaws demonstrating the low level of security of GPS trackers and 
their associated infrastructures. In order to make this study as generic as possible, we have 
procured the best-selling GPS trackers online. 
 
III. Security evaluations 
The methodology applied to analyze the GPS trackers and their infrastructures is well 
known by security researchers. Starting by the analysis of each component (hardware, software 
and network), the security assessment can then be tailored to specific scenarios.  
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In this section, we summarize security flaws we discovered regarding different attack 
scenarios and possible exploitation techniques (when not fully performed in this study). 
Moreover, the complexity and the criticality of these issues are discussed. 
 
III.A. Data collecting and forwarding 
As a first step, a network traffic analysis was carried out to understand the type of data 
exchanged between the GPS trackers and the remote servers as well as the communication 
protocols. In a black-box context, we set up a base-station 2G/2.5G (GPRS) with a generic 
configuration of the Yatebts [8]. It is noted that the majority of trackers only support SIM cards 
due to the integrated baseband. 
 
 
Figure 3: Setup for capturing data sent from GPS trackers to the remote servers 
For regulatory constraints, the set of GPS trackers has been placed in a Faraday cage. Each of 
our GPS trackers is equipped with a SIM card and an assigned unique number as represented 
on Figure 3. Once the BTS was operational, the GPRS traffic was captured with the sgsntun 
interface. Using the provided user manual, the SMS commands recommended by the 
manufacturer to parameterize each of our trackers have been send. Interestingly, during this 
configuration phase, the following critical items have been observed:  
 all trackers send coordinates to IPs in China – confirmation of the location of remote 
servers; 
 the traffic is not encrypted and is easily identifiable (specific domain names, specific IPs, 
specific ports) - the implementation deep packet inspection tool is trivial to perform for this 
type of protocol;  
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 the password of one platform was sent in plain text, other platforms use the serial number 
of the trackers (predictable) as a token without authentication mechanism, allowing an 
attacker to send forged information; 
 it is possible, via an SMS, to edit the tracker configuration and specify another management 
server ("* reg my_ip"), allowing an attacker to perform a simple MITM via an Internet 
server relaying the traffic (UDP or TCP - according to the trackers), with for example 
balance (1) for TCP: 
balance -b ::ffff:mon_ip 8841 203.130.62.29:8841 
 it is possible to define a master phone number. In case of Caller-ID spoofing, this 
authentication can be bypassed. In addition, even without having the defined master phone 
number, it is possible to send commands via SMS to retrieve information from the GPS 
tracker, thus making it possible to detect trackers for a range of phone numbers - this last 
method will not be discrete. 
 Trackers using a U-BLOX GPS module connect to a TCP service on the 56447/tcp port. 
By default, the client sends his login, password, latitude, longitude and altitude without 
integrity or confidentiality protection at the beginning of the TCP session: 
cmd=full;user=XXXXXX@gmail.com;pwd=XXXXXX;lat=22.680193;lon=114.
146846;alt=0.0;pacc=100.00 
The server responds by specifying a proprietary blob: 
u-blox a-gps server (c) 1997-2009 u-blox AG 
Content-Length: 2856 
Content-Type: application/ubx 
.b..0...... 
 
The client then regularly sends information to a second server (8011 / tcp) indicating its 
position: 
*HQ,17000XXXXX,V1,115112,A,2240.8116,N,11408.8108,E,000.0,000.00,100119,FFFFFFFF# 
*HQ,17000XXXXX,NBR,094111,310,26,02,1,1000,10,23,100119,FFFFFFFF# 
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*HQ,17000XXXXX,LINK,115112,22,0,6,0,0,100119,FFFFFFFF# 
*HQ,17000XXXXX,NBR,115117,310,26,02,1,1000,10,22,100119,FFFFFFFF# 
Different commands can be detected according to the serial number (17000XXXXX). 
2240.8116 corresponds to the latitude 22.408116, 11408.8108 at the latitude 11.4088108. 
There is no authentication, which allowed us to implement our own GPS client sending GPS 
coordinates. It can be seen Figure 4 that our GPS tracker is currently located in Pyongyang in 
North Korea as shown. 
 
 
Figure 4: Transmission of fake GPS coordinates through the vulnerable web interface without authentication 
 
A second (less expensive) tracker has no authentication to enable the server to verify the source 
of the collected data (through SMS or any data transmitted in 2G). The data sent to the 
management platform is always in the form: 
yy.I.[S/N][BLOB-ASCII].~[BLOB-ASCII]  
An interesting point is that it sends all SMS messages received on its radio interface to China, 
allowing the manufacturer to know exactly what the user is doing (network capture shown 
Figure 5 - analysis performed with Wireshark).  
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Figure 5: SMS forwarded to the manufacturer 
 
In response of sending an SMS "Status" to one of our GPS trackers, it has been observed 
that the targeted device sends a TCP packet to 203.130.62.29:8841/tcp, an IP geo-located in 
China, but actually located in the UAE and announced by the operator Etisalat, containing the 
message "Status", with the following additional information:  
690217122612463 corresponding to the S/N of the GPS tracker 
+440025239 being the number of the issuer of the SMS 
This works for any SMS message, even if it does not correspond to a management SMS. An 
interesting use of this GPS Tracker would be to act as low-cost SMS relay system (<15 euros), 
by changing the management server IP address.  
 
In general, the network security of GPS trackers is very low as it has been observed that the 
traffic is in plain text and is easily reverse engineered. Moreover, an attacker able to guess a 
serial number can send false information to the GPS management infrastructure. 
 
III.B. Firmware extraction and reverse engineering 
The opening of the trackers made it possible to highlight the simplicity of the electronics 
used as we find mainly old MediaTek chipsets (MT6261 ARM) and GPS chipsets (eg U-
BLOX). Debug interfaces are available for extracting firmware and default configuration 
items. Note that this part is not really a challenge since no protection against physical attacks 
has been integrated (Figure 5, opposite).  
 
Once connected to the UART, the mtd blocks have been extracted. An analysis has been 
performed in order to detect potential hidden or undocumented commands. An example for 
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one of the tested devices is shown in Figure 6. For this device, the embedded system is Nucleus 
RTOS and the OS size is typical for embedded hardware (4MB). Reversing of this dump 
allowed to reveal the presence of backdoors SMS codes in different GPS trackers. 
Unfortunately, not all of these SMS commands seem to be functional. This could be due to the 
use of the same firmware for different GPS trackers models of the same manufacturer. 
 
The analysis did not reveal any major hidden features, but rather showed that the software 
seems to have been developed quickly due to the poor programming practices. It also has been 
observed that no firmware update features exist.  
 
 
Figure 6: Reverse engineering of the extracted firmware with IDA 
 
III.C. Security of mobile applications 
The manufacturer provides applications for iOS / Android smartphones, allowing the 
access to data gathered by the GPS trackers on a world map. Static and dynamic reverse 
engineering was performed on the Android application. The worst finding with the static 
analysis performed with the jadx utility [9] is an unsecured transfer of critical data over http. 
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Figure 7 - HTTP traffic analysis 
Further checking with dynamic analysis confirmed that the exchanges between the smartphone 
application and the remote server are done via http through a proprietary API system 
http://m.999gps.net/OpenAPIV2.asmx. We can see the identifier 82383 corresponding to the 
tracker (details depicted on Figure 7). It is also possible to access the Web Services Description 
Language (WSDL) of the API by adding WSDL to the address to retrieve a complete 
description of the service. Finally, the manufacturers provide an online debug interface as 
shown Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8- Debug interface of the API 
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By analyzing the traffic, it appeared that there is no authentication mechanism and that 
replaying the query parsed previously by Wireshark and changing the identifier makes it 
possible to retrieve the coordinates of other GPS trackers. This vulnerability was already 
reported by the Trackmaggedon team [1] in January 2018, but never been corrected by the 
manufacturer. 
 
III.D. Security of management websites and advanced attacks 
When buying a GPS tracker, it is provided with an identifier and a password for a website 
to access the information reported by the GPS tracker. By analyzing these websites, the 
following security flaws have been discovered: 
 By default, the user name and password are the last 7 characters of the GPS tracker 
serial number. Users do not seem to know that they have to change the password and 
do not change passwords. It is thus possible for an attacker to provision all available 
accounts due to a lack of awareness 
 It was possible, from the account of a GPS Tracker A to access to the coordinates of a 
GPS tracker B (in our possession) by specifying the ID of the tracker B in the http 
request of the tracker A - this is due to an insecure direct object reference vulnerability 
exploitable in the limit of having a random valid session. An example of the 
unauthenticated extraction of GPS coordinates history for a test tracker is depicted 
Figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9 - Un-authenticated extraction of the history of a tracker 
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 Regarding, the specificity of GPS trackers inserted between the engine and the 
stop/start command with a remote control: it has been possible to add a geo-fence area 
to the trackers being used to remotely manage a vehicle engine, causing an alert if the 
vehicle leaves the area or allowing stop the engine stop. This has been successfully 
achieved through un-authenticated request send to the management interface targeting 
one of the test tracker as shown Figure 10. 
 
 
Figure 10 – Un-authenticated Geo-fence added on a remote tracker 
 The interface provides access to the full history of GPS tracker data accessible through 
the same insecure direct object reference vulnerability. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
As part of this study, we focused on the security and privacy issues of GPS trackers. It 
has been observed that various attack scenarios can be easily exploited in order to obtain the 
location information of the GPS trackers in an illegitimate way and that the protection of data 
exchanges was almost non-existent for all the tested devices. Configuration interfaces via SMS 
whose authentication is either non-existent or is easily circumvented via CallerID spoofing 
expose users to information leakage and to critical attacks due to the advanced features of 
certain models such as the remote control of vehicle engines. Moreover, many security issues 
have been found in APIs and websites as well as mobile applications. 
Obviously, the different vulnerabilities are not limited to a single type of exploitation. 
The retrieved information was quite complete, including information from the surrounding 
telecommunication networks and GPS coordinates. These allows an attacker to effectively map 
the critical mobile telecom infrastructure of a given country. Trips and visited places are also 
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strategic information since, in correlation with work schedules, an attacker is able to know 
when and where a target works and where he lives. All the mentioned data is already present 
in the manufacturers servers recalling the software bug for the transfer of GPS coordinates of 
CelI-IDs in iOS [10]. 
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